This paper considers changes in the symbolic boundaries of French society under the influence of neoliberalism. As compared to the early nineties, stronger boundaries toward the poor and Blacks are now being drawn while North-African immigrants and their offsprings continue to be largely perceived as outside the community of those who deserve recognition and protection. Moreover, while the social reproduction of upper-middle class privileges has largely remained unchanged, there is a blurring of the symbolic boundaries separating the middle and working class as the latter has undergone strong individualization. Also, the youth is now bearing the brunt of France's non-adaptation to changes in the economy and is increasingly marginalized. The result is a dramatic change in the overall contours of the French symbolic community, with a narrowed definition of cultural membership, and this, against a background of growing inequality, unemployment, and intolerance in a more open and deregulated
French society has experienced dramatic social changes over the past decades, which have resulted in a significant reshuffling of its symbolic boundaries, moving the poor and ethno-racial minorities toward the periphery of the community of those worthy of recognition, protection, and assistance.
ii As we move into the 21 st century, the redrawing of the lines that divide this national community needs to be better understood, as it echoes profound changes found elsewhere in Europe.
While an abundance of literature details some of these changes, this essay provides a bird-eye view of the recent transformations in the French case in the hope of inspired more research on the inequalities and divisions at play in contemporary France.
When writing about social transformation in France, social scientists often start with a diagnosis of French Republicanism and other central cultural traditions, such as Catholicism and Socialism. Even though these traditions enable different types of cultural identities and behaviors, scholars agree that all three currents contributed to producing symbolic boundary patterns where internal ethno-racial differences and poverty were downplayed as principles of division.
iii Following a specific interpretation of the central tenets of liberalism, French Republicanism has traditionally posited citizens with equal rights voluntarily and explicitly entering into a covenant by which they delegate their political sovereignty to the state, whose role is to define and to promote the common good and insure universalism by downplaying ethno-racial and religious differences between citizens. iv Until quite recently, the fusion of this liberal Republican ideology with the Marxian rhetoric of class warfare also encouraged French workers to downplay divisions separating workers from the poor, while pitting "les petits" against "les gros." For its part, Catholicism has historically emphasized commonalities among all human beings (as "children of God") and as a consequence made boundaries toward the poor not salient, while stressing charity and mutual obligations, which was translated in Republican law through the notion of "Fraternity." v At the same time, the nationalistic-universalistic worldview embedded in the French Republican ideology led French workers to draw strong boundaries between themselves and less civilized "outsiders," particularly those from former colonies and their off-spring. Based on interviews conducted with workers in the early 1990s, Lamont argued that these three traditions converged to produce a society with relatively weak ethno-racial symbolic boundaries and weak symbolic exclusion of the poor, as well as stronger boundaries separating the French "us" from immigrants, the foreign "them." vi This is particularly salient when it comes to Islam, widely perceived as non-French, non-European, and antithetical to Christianity.
In the past several decades, the spread of neo-liberalism has encouraged an increase in individualization and a decline in social solidarity, which challenge these prevailing boundary patterns.
On the one hand, the strong state has encouraged individualization, as the public redistribution of Sewell), x neo-liberalism has manifested itself in a series of mutually reinforcing changes occurring simultaneously at multiple levels, through market fundamentalism at the economic level, a distinctive use of rhetoric, laws and public policies aiming at reinforcing market mechanisms at the political level, the multiplication of auditing tools at the administrative level (with an eye for greater accountability and marketization), and a deep transformation of shared definitions of worth (in favor of economic performance) and a narrowing of symbolic communities and solidarities at the cultural level. Our objective is not to explore the extent of such changes in the French case. Instead we largely posit them and focus our attention on the cultural level to describe various changes in symbolic boundaries that result from other mutually reinforcing transformation that are generally described as "neoliberal."
xi Issues of causality should be the topic of a separate analysis.
The Early Nineties
Lamont's The Dignity of Working Men (hereafter, DWM) provides the baseline for our analysis.
Drawing on 150 in-depth interviews with randomly sampled blue collar workers and low-status white collar workers conducted in the early nineties in the suburbs of Paris and New York, this book argued that French and American workers alike define their own worth and that of others based on moral criteria -their ability to persist in being responsible people who keep the world in moral order, get their kids to behave, pay their bills, and survive despite difficult work conditions. DWM also showed that both American and French workers use this moral language to draw boundaries toward the outsiders for their moral failings -middle-class people, the poor, blacks, and immigrants -and that these various groups are not equally singled out in the two countries. Indeed, Lamont argued that for the French workers she interviewed, when mentioned, the poor were generally taken in as part of "us," understood to be not social leeches but the unfortunate temporary victim of the imperfections of capitalism, or members of the reserve army of workers Marx wrote about. Racial minorities were also taken in as part of "us," as French interviewees downplayed phenotype as a basis for differentiation, in line with
French republicanism that prescribes making abstraction of ascribed characteristics as criteria for inclusion in the symbolic community. The book also showed that French workers used the language of moral worth to draw strong boundaries against immigrants, largely reduced to Muslim immigrants, because of their alleged moral failings, that is, their inability to be self-reliant, responsible, and respectful of human and women rights, and their unwillingness to assimilate to French culture. Finally, the French workers also drew relatively strong moral boundaries toward middle-class people and the elite for their lack of personal integrity and solidarity, inability to be loyal to their friends, narcissism and obsession with self-promotion.
In contrast to American workers, French workers were found to downplay the internal segmentation of their society by integrating among "people like us" individuals located in the lower echelons of society. A detailed analysis of the interviews suggested that the majority of the French interviewees were indifferent toward or silent about the poor, while this was the case for only a quarter of the American workers interviewed, half of whom drew moral boundaries against the poor. Also, a number of French workers explicitly expressed solidarity toward people below them in the social structure, drawing on a vocabulary of class struggle and class solidarity to point out that "we are all wage-earners, we are all exploited." References to welfare recipients and the unemployed were at times accompanied by a critique of the capitalist system. For instance, a bank clerk said "I think it is unacceptable that some people are unemployed while others can work as much as they want." A wood salesman concurred when he stated that market mechanisms should not determine salaries, and that "all workers should be reasonably well paid." Like others, this salesman opposed classical liberalism and its invisible hand because it was inhuman and penalized the weak. Workers frequently referred to elements of Republicanism, Catholicism, and Socialism as cultural repertoires that supported social solidarity among citizens (independently of race), among the poor, and among workers, respectively. For Lamont, these symbolic boundaries having to do with shared definitions of "us" and "them" and with widely shared moral criteria of worth, are a necessary but insufficient conditions for the creation of social boundaries. xii These manifest themselves in the distribution of resources, and in demographic patterns of association, segregation, and social proximity. Understanding where the moral lines are drawn is essential for making sense of the inequality landscape of any society.
Twenty Years Later
Since Lamont's interviews were conducted in the early 1990s, neo-liberalism, and particularly market fundamentalism and the privatization of risks, have come to reshape profoundly how the French think about the contours of the symbolic community of people worth defending and protecting. The literature on social change in France over the last twenty years provides abundant evidence of these transformations. We describe them by considering various types of class boundaries before turning to ethno-racial boundaries.
Class: a Composite Picture
French sociology has produced an abundant and sophisticated literature on changes in the class structure over the past decades. Particularly noteworthy is Coulangeon's research, which builds on the Bourdieusian tradition to study class differentiation in cultural practices using survey data. shown that access to education remains the key mechanism for the production of inequality, at a time when the French government is directing more resources toward the well-off in budgetary appropriations for schools, which disproportionately go to middle -class establishments.
xvii While these various studies suggest the persistence of social boundaries separating the working class from the middle class, a strong symbolic boundary based on moral criteriahas developed separating the general population from a small elite composed of CEOs, international civil servants, and movie and sports stars, whose incomes have grown steadily, leading to earnings often described as "indecent." xviii Since the early 2000s, individuals belonging to this tiny loosely-defined elite have accumulated disproportionate advantages: financial and otherwise. xix Moreover, while some would argue that France has resisted the trend towards greater inequalities, xx wealth has become far more visible and accepted as a criterion of worth, in line with the neo-liberal emphasis on competitiveness and economic success. Yet, the centrality of equality in French political culture has contributed to a growing resentment against "les riches," who are perceived to be part of a selfish and self-serving global elite. This group's legitimacy is weak in part because it is associated with high culture. The latter has become marginal, if not deviant, in a landscape where omnivorous cultural orientations have gained ground, with a growing number of individuals appreciating a range of cultural tastes and genres (from low to middle brow and high culture).
xxi By some measure, the literature on inequality in France still lends empirical support to the three-tiered social structured described in Bourdieu's Distinction, opposing on the one hand a dominant class that cumulates economic and cultural capital, and on the other, a petty-bourgeoisie that relies only on cultural capital and a working class that benefits neither from cultural nor from economic capital. Paradoxically, although social reproduction continues unchallenged, income inequality is increasing, and there is a growing belief that upward mobility is no longer possible for the younger generations, xxvi some of the changes described above have led to a blurring of symbolic boundaries separating the dominant and the dominated classes (to use Bourdieu'sterminology). Indeed, the working class is now much more open to the broader society than was the case two or three decades ago, when this class group was turned inward and strongly invested in an "us versus them" relationship with the rest of society. Under market pressures and the individualization process spurred by employers. xxvii competition among individual workers has replaced former collective identities in the workplace. xxviii Moreover, through the democratization of high school and university education, as well as the replacement of industrial work by service work, members of the French working class have now developed "soft skills" associated with white-collar jobs (e.g. people skills relevant for emotional labor). xxix They have also obtained tertiary degrees that may assist them in upward mobility, while also further eroding their collective identity and sense of collective belonging. At the same time, this working class is increasingly making use of psychological ideas and techniques to deal with challenges (at work as well as in their personal lives), which is refashioning working-class gender roles by some measure. xxx Class boundaries have also been eroded by the development of a lower middle-class labeled the "little-middle," an intermediary group between the working class (from whence they come) and the middle class (to which they aspire), which has strongly embracedmany of the main tenets of neo-liberalism. xxxi This group has been described as the core target audience for a highly individualistic and psychological rhetoric used by former president Nicolas Sarkozy -a rhetoric that has weakened working-class identity. In fact, many of Sarkozy's speeches can be interpreted as feeding a transformation of collective imaginaries in a direction that is consistent with the tenets of neoliberalism.
The Poor
In strong contrast with the blurring of symbolic boundaries described above, moral boundaries toward the poor have hardened significantly and rapidly: the poor have been asked by politicians, policy makers, and public opinion to demonstrate more autonomy and self-reliance. This suggests a convergence in the construction of the poor in France and the United States.
Until quite recently, one could find evidence that the poor were still taken in as part of a broad definition of the French "us," as revealed by large manifestations of solidarity towards the homeless (for instance, during the 2006 "Don Quichotte" protest movement in support of individuals camping along the banks of the Canal St-Martin). xxxii But more generally, since the end of the nineties, the onus for self-sufficiency came to be increasingly placed on the poor, who were asked to take personal responsibility for their own fate. Nicolas Duvoux's book, L'autonomie des assistés, shows important changes in how the poor are framed in the French context: institutions that take care of the poor are now submitting them to norms of autonomy that downplay their vulnerability and demand from them moral fortitude (in line with the rhetoric of individual resilience that often goes hand in hand with neoliberalism). xxxiii These institutions of social service target the poor, the youth, and immigrants, and they encourage these "marginal" populations to develop a self-concept centered on the "refusal of dependency" -which often leads to self-blaming. More generally, the situation of youth has both deteriorated and diverged. At one end of the spectrum, the young are more at risk of poverty as they enter a dual society and face considerable challenges in gaining access to stable employment and independent housing (especially in Paris). More than 40 percent of the young adults living in concentrated poverty areas are unemployed and 17 percent of the 15/29-year-olds are neither employed nor in education or training. xlv Risks are multiplied for second generation immigrants and high school drop-outs. xlvi At the other extreme, elite students still have access to a more predictable "royal trajectory," by which they enter a "Grande école" in their early 20s to begin a career in a "Grand corps" in their late 20s or early 30s, which will lead them to the highest ranks and positions. The availability of such a trajectory suggests the persistence of social mechanisms of class reproduction at the upper end of the class spectrum.
To recap, the composite and paradoxical landscape we have depicted is one where persisting social reproduction and strong social boundaries between the working class and other groups coexists with weakened symbolic boundaries, as the working class and the little-middle loosen their class identification. Simultaneously, moral boundaries are drawn toward the elite and yet stronger moral boundaries are erected toward the poor who are increasingly viewed as undeserving and lacking in self-reliance -an inexcusable flaw under neo-liberalism, where the privatization of risk reigns supreme.
Moreover, youth are sacrificed as the bearers of the cost of economic transition, at the same time as, to a certain extent, stable middle age and older workers enjoy a modicum of stable employment and the social benefits that accompany it, as shown by Chauvel, Palier and Van de Velde.
This composite portrait does suggest a major reshuffling of France's symbolic boundaries, away from a simple opposition between the dominant and the dominated class toward a world of narrowed communities of solidarity which maintain at the periphery the poor and the young, and to a lesser extent, a declining working class. Against the sacred tenets of Republicanism, as argued in the next section, these groups are also joined by ethno-racial minorities in the periphery of the French symbolic community of those worthy of assistance and recognition. Whereas ethno-racial minorities are often stigmatized, the youth may be suffering more from indifference than from actual exclusion.
Ethno-Racial Differences
One of the most striking trends in the recent years is the growing importance of race in public debates in France. In DWM, Lamont argued that the high salience of immigrants in the boundaries that her French interviewees drew was especially remarkable when compared to the place that workers gave to alternative bases of segmentation, and particularly to racial others (mostly blacks) and to the poor.
xlvii
In stark contrast, the urban riots of 2005 brought about widespread denunciation of the assumed role of African and North African youth in these uprisings. Ever since, the issue of "integration" of racially defined "others" -even if they are French -has tended to overshadow the importance of the traditional "social questions" as identified in Marxist theory (i.e., poverty and exploitation). Along the same lines, Fassin and Fassin have shown how discourses on race and class came to be inextricably intertwined in the late 2000s. xlviii They suggest that while for decades the importance of race was denied by the French
Republic ideology of color-blindness, it suddenly reappeared at the core of public debates in the mid2000s, obscuring the structural obstacles minority members faced --(such as higher poverty and unemployment rates.) The newly available survey data from Enquêtes Trajectoires et Origines, conducted by the Institut national d'études démographiques, has improved our understanding of ethnoracial discrimination, but it remains difficult to assess its importance in the absence of exhaustive and longitudinal measures. France has long resisted and, to a certain extent, still resists, the use of religious and ethno-racial categories in public data collection, and this, largely for historical reasons related to the cooperation of French authorities with the Nazi occupation during the Second World War. Thus, it is only recently that the levels and patterns of ethno-racial inequalities can be studied systemically.
Drawing on newly available qualitative and quantitative data, Safi has demonstrated the presence of discrimination in all the major aspects of social life, ranging from employment to housing and school and political participation.). xlix A review of the literature unambiguously reveals that members of visible minorities, Blacks and North-African, are more salient as undesirable members of the French symbolic community than they were two decades ago. This is also the case for Romas, who were not salient when Lamont conducted her study in the early 1990s. This group has been the object of substantial local political pressures in recent years (e.g., lobby for evictions by local residents). It is now regularly framed as a "problem" by French elites. Over the last decade, France's black population has become far more visible, as it is developing a stronger collective identity and sense of its own history, lii generating social movements, and forming
Blacks

associations (such as the Conseil Représentatif des Associations Noires, founded in 2005).
Simultaneously, sociologists are producing detailed studies of this group, documenting how they understand and respond to stigmatization and discrimination. liii To some extent, their stronger collective identity and heightened public visibility may feed into the symbolic boundaries that are now being constructed against this group by proponents of Republican color-blindness. However, surveys show that the index of tolerance of minorities has remained relatively stable since 1990 when it comes to blacks, perhaps because this category includes both Caribbean citizens and African immigrants. Europe's closure towards the migrants due to the recurrent and deadly sinking of migrants' boats.
We have documented the heighted symbolic boundaries that the French now draw toward Blacks, who were not salient in the early 1990s and toward North Africans, not to mention the Romas (whom we discussed too briefly). Several factors contribute to this growing fear of outsiders. First, like many European societies, France is aging at a faster pace than its North American counterparts. boundary is not about to weaken.
Conclusion
We have provided evidence for important changes in the symbolic boundaries organizing
France's symbolic community. We have described these changes as an expression of, and as resulting from, simultaneously occurring and mutually reinforcing neo-liberal transformations in the economic, political, administrative and cultural realms. While space precludes a full discussion of the causal mechanisms at play, we have singled out a few relevant processes. At the economic level, the spread of neo-liberalism has meant a larger scale implementation of market mechanisms in a wider range of contexts and organizations, and in the labor market. At the political and administrative levels, elites have played a central role in promoting more market driven rhetoric, regulation and standards of value.
Evidence suggests that various segments of the population have been unequally affected by the changes: while youth is carrying the burden of the changes and are most at risk, middle age and older individuals continue to benefit from their long-term participation in the labor market and from the protection of corporate and labor organizations. The large-scale development of means-tested programs (which considered together cover approximately one out of ten French people) suggests that neoliberalism not only manifested itself in a dismantling of the welfare state, but also in its significant reorientation. More specifically, new public policy programs reshape inequality by creating a distinction between insiders (who receive benefits) and outsiders (who do not have access to social protection).
Thus, one can conclude that more integrated and better endowed members of the French polity have responded to neo-liberal changes by shifting the cost of adapting to the new conditions onto the most marginal, fragile and stigmatized categories of the population: the poor, the young, ethnic "others" (even if the latter are French as they were born on French territory), and especially the less educated in these categories. lxviii Both the class and racial dimensions have to be taken into consideration in order to understand the reshaping of symbolic boundaries in contemporary French society at the dawn of this 21 st century.
Neoliberalism has also led to a breakdown of collective identities among workers, through individualization of aspirations and self-identities. However, this change did not coincide with a distribution of the cultural and economic resources necessary for the realization of an individual project of social mobility. On the contrary. Moreover, in a context of growing inequalities, "others" of various sorts come to be blamed for the ills the country faces and for abusing increasingly scarce collective resources. Thus, the notion of "solidarity" came to be defined in narrower terms over these last three Although historically marked by a high level of inequality, French society has valued a strong egalitarian ideology since the French Revolution. Against this background, it is likely that it will have troubles coping with growing inequality in the long run. The continuing xenophobia and the ongoing institutionalization of the National Front as a major political force should be a major source of concern.
These developments are all the more problematic since, as leading demographers have shown, lxx France's ethno-racial diversity will only increase in a context where social insecurity fueled by (longterm) unemployment and work scarcity is likely to become more salient. In the coming decades, either
France will have to correct these trends through greater equality and work toward a greater recognition of these populations, or else, risk further marginalization, alienation, and a new wave of major riots and protests. We identify symbolic boundaries based on survey data and in-depth studies of how various groups are constructed (positively or negatively) in the French landscape. At times we also consider the social boundaries faced by groups. The latter are "objectified forms of social differences manifested in unequal access to and unequal distribution of resources and social opportunities' (Lamont and Molnar, "The Study of Boundaries in the Social Sciences." p. 168). A more detailed analysis would consider the interaction of symbolic and social boundaries in the creation of the French symbolic community and the specific content of various types of symbolic boundaries (i.e. the criteria (moral, cultural, socioeoconomic, and others) by which various groups are rejected). (Verso, 2007.) xxviii
